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HEGEL'S THEORY OF TRAGEDY
BV SALVATORE RUSSO
HEGEL'S theory of tragedy, like that of Aristotle, is an integral
part of his whole philosophy. Aristotle's idea of katharsis.
for example, is characteristic of his philosophy of art : art imitates
nature both in its purpose and in its method, continuing where
nature leaves off. Hegel's theory of tragedy is even more closely
integrated with the entire structure and nature of his thought ; it
is so basic a part of his swstem that it is found scattered through-
out his works rather than contained in a single volume. The essence
of tragedy consists of a diremption of the Spirit arising from the
second stage or moment of the dialectical process. Our purpose is
to examine the validity of this ethical division as the substance of
tragedy, a task which can be accomplished only after we have
sketched the theory in its contextual setting.
Tragedy is not a phenomenon peculiar to literature ; its counter-
part is found in metaphysics, religion, and in daily life as well, for
every phase of reality reveals the dialectic at work. lUit whatever
may be the context, the nature of tragedy is always the same.
In life, as in literature, tragedy signifies that the Spirit is divided,
that it is suft'ering from an inner dissonance due to the contiict of
imiversal and particular. This tragic conflict always ensues when
an individual part negates a universal. Self-alienated by the neces- .
sity of its own nature, this particular spirit becomes too assertive
and feels the overpowering force of the universal. Thus human
sorrow reaches its greatest depth when the opposition between the
particular and uni\ersal makes itself felt.
A tragic character, accordingl\-, is one estranged from his com-
plete self, one who feels the pangs of isolation and the insufficiency
of a divided nature. Mindful that his spiritual life has been tom
in twain, he seeks to escape that painful feeling of otherness by
which he is possessed. His unconscious endeavor is to return to
his estranged self, for when one stops short of the Xotioii one
learns tragedy. Tragedy, then, is the penalty paid for individuality.
The nature of tragedy is now clear ; it consists of a heroic nega-
tion of the unixersal, which eventually leads to a synthesis. It is
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always to be understood as the middle term of a triadic unity, the
medial part of a cycle of the dialectic. To attempt to explain tragedy
independently of its thesis and synthesis is to falsify its nature and
misunderstand its purpose.
Hegel found many examples of this triadic movement in the his-
tory of religion. In Indian philosophy, for example, Brahma was
originally everything, self-sufficient and complete. This pantheistic
nature of Brahma constituted the thesis, symbolized, perhaps, by the
statues of Brahma gazing at his navel. But there came a time when
Brahma tired of this monotonous solitude and desired something
other than himself, something that might contrast with his eternal
quietude and infinite ennui. Whereupon he is said to have made
this world, a wu^rld of illusions called the veil of Maya. He breathed
it in and out, forming a cycle of illusions ; the world became a process
that staggered and reeled, life a senseless journey in this merry-go-
rornd of eternal recurrence. This was the antithesis or negation.
The reconcilation lay in the understanding that this life was some-
thing other than Brahma : to be saved one had to renounce this life
and return to the consciousness of Brahma. If this reconcilation was
deemed inadequate and weak, it contained, nevertheless, a powerful
thesis and negation.
In the colorful life of Jesus, Hegel found the perfect thesis, anti-
thesis, and synthesis and therefore the most perfect example of
tragedy outside of the drama. The unusual birth of the Saviour
and His divine nature constituted the thesis. To Jesus the realization
that He was the Son of God constituted His greatest joy, and the
consciousness of His mortality, symbolic of His finitude. His great-
est sorrow. The negation and diremption was dramatically portrayed
by suffering death on the cross for His death was a denial of His
divinity and an expression of His separateness from God. The poig-
nant utterance of this disunion and sorrow is contained in the words
of dereliction and despair, "My God, my God. why hast thou for-
saken me?" The Resurrection is the synthesis. Here again we have
the reunion of flesh and spirit, of the human and divine.'
iThis is only one of the many ideas of the Christian trilogies. The vaguest
is that of the Father. Son, and Holy Ghost, existing somewhere in the skies.
Then we have that of God. Satan, and Jesus : God who made the world. Satan
who sunk it in sin, and Jesus who redeemed it. We have also that of God
man, and Christ; God as divine, man as human, and Christ as the union of
these two. The example given above seems to show this trilogy in the life
of Jesus himself.
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In art, tragedy is depicted as a coniiict between forces that ought
to be in harmony. Tragic situations arise from a transgression of
balance, from a collision of interests between an intinite power and
a finite one, between a luiiversal claim on the one hand, and a par-
ticular assertion on the other. This collision destroys the harmony
by throwing the ideal Spirit into dissonance. The task of art, conse-
quently, is to keep the ideal from perishing, and at the same time
develop the opposition so that harmony will appear again at the
denouement.
Suitable examples of such collisions restoring unity t(^ the spir-
itual world exist in dramatic art alone, for painting can portray a
single time or moment, and sculpture embodies only completed ac-
tion.- Dramatic poetry, howexer, presents a whole development: the
original serenity, the discord, and the reestablished harmony.
In the PhoiODiciiology of Mind Hegel attempted to give some-
thing of an historical treatment of this triadic movement as it made
itself manifest in literature: hrst as epic, then as tragedy, and tinally
as comedy.
In the first stage the universal consciousness was undilYerentiated
and unfulfilled : the individual as such counted for little. The Greek
gods and heroes were so much alike, their deeds and purposes were
so commingled, that they could hardly be separated. In (ireek his-
tory the universal content consisted of an assembley of national
heroes : in literature it existed as e])ic. The minstrel was the indi-
vidual actual spirit ; it was not his own self that was of any account,
but that of his Muse, his universal song. In the epic, where the poet
efi:'aced himself from his work, destiny was portrayed as the result
of forces outside of the hero : the personal will was at the mercy
of destiny.
The antithesis was tragedy. Here the sj>ecific nature of the
2It is true that painting, for the most part, gives us only one moment ot
action. Christ Delivering the Keys by Perugino and Leonardo's Last Supper,
which deals with the moment that Jesus says someone will betray him, illus-
trate this fact. And even when a complete story is attempted, such as Masaccio's
Tribute Money, Botticelli's History of Moses, as illustrated by the several scenes,
each deals with a single moment, and the picture as a whole is stat-'c. But Hegel's
statement that sculpture gives us completed action is not necessarily true : sculp-
ture does not necessarily give us completed action any more than painting does.
Works of sculpture like Myron's Athena and Marsyas, Apollo Belvedere attrib-
uted to Loechares, Donatello's David, or the Laocoon do give us completed
action. But many statues, the Diseobulus and ^^lichelangelo's David, to mention
two, deal with a single moment, the moment just before the action is performed.
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hero affirmed itself, came into conflict with its own universahty, and,
forgetting its real and dependent nature, deemed itself self-sufficient.
But this assumed independence was dominated by the unitv of the
Notion, causing the individual to feel the strength of his life broken,
and to mourn his fate. Yet he was sublime in his separateness from
the Gods, since "sublimity involves on the side of man the feeling
of his own finiteness and his insuperable remoteness from God."
Eventually this universality, opposed by its specific nature, has to be
unified and reconciled with itself.
When the incompatible demands were finally cancelled and the
ethical substance was victorious in its struggle for harmony, we had
comedy. Comedy began with the implied reconcilation found at the
close of tragedy, and gave us a self-certainty and cheerfulness that
nothing could disturb. Aristophanes is said to have written such
comedies, and Falstaft' is supposed to be a good example of the
Absolute hero that comedy demands. The self-consciousness of the
hero must be united with the universal consciousness in order to
have comedy. "The self-consciousness of the hero must step forth
from its mask and be presented as knowing itself to be the fate of
the gods of the chorus and of the absolute powers themselves, and
as being no longer separate from the chorus.'' In tragedy the indi-
viduals destroy each other because they do not have a true and
solid basis ; in comedy individuality is no longer something assumed,
it is something concrete.
If we leave this quasi-historical approach and go to the dramas
themselves we find a specimen of this avowed cycle in the Orestean
trilogy. The first play of the trilog}'. the .Agamemnon, opens with
marked suggestions of serenitv and calm joy. This serenity, how-
ever, is soon broken by the murder of Agamemnon by his wife
Clytemnestra. Her pretext was the death of their daughter Iphe-
genia whom Agamemnon had sacrificed before he sailed for Troy.
In the Choephori, the second play, we have a strong picture of
the division and diremption. Apollo orders Orestes to avenge the
death of his father. Yet Clytemnestra is his mother, and to kill
her is to committ matricide. He is confronted with this dilemma :
either he must avenge the death of his father by matricide, or disobey
Apollo and permit the unholy crime to go unrectified and unpun-
ished. In either case, he will sin. Orestes has no passion for ven-
geance, yet, driven on by the remorseless decree of Apollo, he kills
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his notorious mother and is claimed by both Apollo and the Furies.
Now he feels the "bitterness of soul-diremption," for he realizes
that he has done both good and evil at the same time. This is sug-
gested in the drama by madness stealing over his mind soon after
the crime has been committed.
In the IiiDuciiidcs, the last part of the trilogy, we have a recon-
ciliation of the conflicting powers b}' a happy ending ; the situation
is peacefully resolved by Athena, the arbitrator. The Furies are
appeased and Orestes absolved. Again we have that calm serenity
characteristic of the unity of the ethical substance.
Let us now attend to Antigonc, Hegel's favorite tragedy, which
he thought portrayed his dramatic theory most adequately. Here
Creon represents the power and authority of the state ; he is not a
tyrant, but a moral power seeking to do what he thinks is right.
Antigone, on the other hand, stands for the time-honored rights
and customs that traditionally belong to the family. Her actions
are in accordance with her family obligations and not in defiance
of the state. Yet, living within Creon's domain and civil authority,
Antigone is bound to render obedience to the sovereign's command,
while Creon, a father and a husband, should respect the sanctity of
blood-relationship and not command that which violates this family
piety. Thus wc see how both are etfually right and equally wrong
in what they do, why, though justified in their actions, they are
'seized and broken by the very principles that belong to the sphere
of their own being."-' Antigone must learn that while the family
has its place in the state, there are civil rights outside of it. Creon
must learn that the family, too, has its rights and claims. Antigone,
consequently, precipitates her death unwedded, and Creon, urged bv
the chorus, admits his error and is made to sufl:'er the destruction of
his home by the death of his wife and son. At the close of this
impressive tragedy we. as spectators, feel the weight of each side,
and realize the need for a broader and more inclusive view of life.
Antigone clearly illustrates a basal point that Hegel never tired
of stating, namely, that there is always sj^iritual value on both sides.
Pure evil is empty and unfit for dramatic tragedy. The conflict must
••This tits even the action that has gone before in Antigone. Both of Anti-
gone's brothers, Eteocles and Polynices, fought for their father's throne ; both
are subjectively right in their demand, and yet wrong. Hence both found
their destruction reciprocally through one another.
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be one between powers that are good and noble : a good tragedy
always exhibits the ethical substance in a state of internecine war-
fare. It is like a house divided against itself, a contest between the
family and the state, or one ideal against another, represented by
a struggle between two people, or even within a single individual.
When the conilict is between two people, which is usually the case,
both are dominated by ethical principles such as duty or honor. The
blind devotion to this principle brings on the fatal catastrophe.
The resolution of a tragedy is achieved by a destruction of the
exclusive claims of provincial individuality. Such individuality im-
perils the whole community by its isolated self-sufificiency, and must
be dissolved. Its subjective, self-seeking nature brings on its own
destruction, since its adherence to a single interest is both its weak-
ness and its strength. The denial of the one-sided claim is generally
expressed in the drama by the death of the characters, but the value
of the particular interest is sublated into the whole. What is denied
is the absoluteness of any single position, for the purpose of tragedy
is to show the necessity of a universal and all-inclusive view.
If we turn from a consideration of tragedy as a whole to some
of its dramatic elements, we find that individuality is represented
by the actor's mask ; it is by wearing a mask that a character expe-
riences tragedy: what makes him unique and separate from the uni-
versal spirit is the mask. And consequently it is by discarding the
mask that the tragic situation is resolved.
The actor appears in a double role: he represents the imper-
sonated hero and his own character, his assumed self, and his true
self. Or, to use Hegelian language the hero appearing before the
onlookers breaks up into an actor and a mask. This distinction be-
tween mask and actor is an enlargement of the Aristotelian position
:
the particular characters of the actors are included in a tragedy as
well as the dramatis personae and the spectators.
The chorus represents the totality of sentiments, ideas, and pas-
sions of the drama ; it is the moral or meditative consciousness com-
menting on what is going on : its ultimate purpose is to preserve the
serenity of the drama and the true thought in the audience. Although
it cannot take an active part, since its members are passive and deed-
less, nevertheless it does make itself felt by conveying its judgment
to the spectators.
The audience, awed perhaps by the spectacle, and looking to the
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cliorus for consolation, feels the futility of any one-sided view of
life. The sjiectator allies himself, then, not with the hero as Aristotle
held, hut with the chorus. The onlooker "drinks from the cup of
ahsolute substance." learns the doctrine of selflessness, and leaves
the theater calmed by his lesson, his personal woes overshadowed
l:)y the terrible struggle of the hero.
Yet in another sense we do ally ourselves with the hero, for
the chorus also represents the subjective side of the hero. Thus
the witches in Macbeth, reminding us of Greek tragedy, are objective
representations of the secrets and purposes of his own heart ; observe
how they even repeat his own words. The ghost in Hamlet can also
l)e said t(^ be an expression of the hero's own suspicions and desires.
Uy revealing the hero's soul, the chorus brings him and the audience
closer together, and is reminiscent of the time when the audience
was included within the circle of the stage.
This introduces the question whether it is the hero or the audi-
ence that experiences the reconciliation. Theoretically it is always
the substance that is reconciled. This may be realized either by the
audience or the hero : ultimatel}- the two are one. When the recon-
ciliation is experienced by the spectators it is called objective; and
when it is experienced by the hero or antagonist, subjective. The
Oresleaii Trilogy is an example of the objective, and Oedipus Colo-
nciis an example of the subjective solution. It is true that art is
primarily for the audience that contemplates and enjoys it, but we
must not forget that Hegel does not want the relation between the
issue and the character who represents it lost. In fact, he maintains
that Orestes and Antigone ha\-e significance onl}- in so far as they
represent a ])Ower. Tragedy must have a purpose : otherwise the
tragic is lost, and the end is one of complete frustration.
Most of our tragedies end with the sacrifice of the persons who
identify themselves with some power ; occasionally we have a tragedy
wherein a character lives and sufifers a change of heart, where there
is an internal reconcilation in the mind of the hero. Since the tragic
character must expiate the crime in his own heart, an act which must
be objectified in a drama, this inner change appears more as outward
purification. One cannot help but feel that the aged Oedipus has
attained something of a reconcilation by his own condemnation, mu-
tilation, and austere life. It was with true insight that Jebb said of
him, "Thinking, then, on the great facts of his life, his defilement
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and his innocence, he has come to look npon himself as neither pure
nor yet guilty, but as a person set apart by the gods to illustrate this
will, as sacred."
Hegel's notion of guilt is unique. To act is to dirempt the Spirit,
to act is to incur guilt. All action is laden with guilt and sufifering
;
innocence is merely the absence of action. The antagonist should
realize his wrong-doing beforehand ; he is sublime in that he knows
what is good and what is evil.' It should be evident to everyone
that this is often not the case ; Hegel himself admits that Oedipus
did not recognize his father in the man he killed, nor his mother
in the woman he married. Ajax was mad when he slew the sheep,
and so was Hercules when he slew his children. Hegel is right in
maintaining that the heroes do not hesitate to accept the consecjuences
of their actions, for guilt, however acquired, must be punished.
Oedipus readily accepts the culpability and punishment for the jmtri-
cide and incest which he unwittingly committed.
In summing up, then, we may say that metaphysically tragedy is
an inner conflict of the ethical substance which has temporarily lost
its unity and serenity, though retaining the germs of an inevitable
harmony. Dramatically, tragedy is a story of a conflict of noble
and equally justified interests so opposed as to produce a deadlock.
A resolution takes place when this deadlock is dissolved by the de-
struction of the particular claims and interests that have caused it.
We have seen that Hegel's theory consists of three elements
:
(1) a conflict (2) a division of the ethical substance so that both
sides are justified (3) the implied reconciliation. His theory stands
or falls on the validity of these three basic elements. Since it is
apparent that all tragic plots display a conflict or struggle, we pass
it by without further mention.
The element of reconciliation can be defended because it per-
tains to the ethical substance rather than to the hero ; the resolution
of any conflict permits a case to be made for the advent of harmony.
Romeo and Juliet die, but the play achieves the desired reconciliation
if we emphasize the fact that both houses long enveloped in a deadly
feud have lost their animosity. Cordelia locked in the arms of the
tOn the strength of this, one might say that Macbeth is a better tragedy
than Oedipus, because Macbeth knew what he was doing. It is true, however,
tliat it does not portray the ethical division as well.
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aged Lear, she dead and he mad. may present a hopeless picture to
some, but I legel would maintain that what is proclaimed is the devo-
tion and the hlial relation of father and daughter. Thus almost
e\'ery tragedy can be so explained as to reveal this ultimate harmonv.
The element of ethical division, however, cannot be accepted so
readily, because it is more an accidental and occasional feature than
a necessary one. It would be no difficult matter to enumerate a
host of recognized tragedies that do not display this ethical division.
Should one wish to defend Hegel on the grounds that such dramas
are poor and imperfect specimens of tragedy, let us examine .-infi-
c/oiic, Hegel's model.
Hegel believed that both contestants in this drama are equally
right, that So]:ihccles intended to display a balanced opposition of
just forces, and that the spectators consider Creon as justified as
Antigone, thereby dividing their sympathy between both characters.
If this were true we should expect to find that their guilt and pun-
ishment is the same, assuming, of course, that thev suffer in pro-
portion to their crime. But their guilt is not the same, and their
punishment is strikingl}' dififerent.
b^irst of all the imputation that Creon is not entirely noble is not
without some justification : his condemnation of Antigone for trans-
gressing his mandate is an example of inexcusable tyranny. It is
less than a day since he has been made king of Thebes, the two
heirs having killed each other the day before. Antigone, moreover,
the daughter of Oedipus, is his ward and niece, and betrothed to
his son, Haemon. Small wonder that dramatists such as Alfieri and
Dryden have made him out to be a scheming tyrant who has the
edict proclaimed that Antigone and her sister Ismene could be de-
stroyed. This is an interpretation, as we shall show, that can be
supported by the text of Sophocles.
Creon enters the scene by acquainting the chorus of elders with
the content of his edict. They give no indication that they are not
going to respect his mandate. In fact, they say that they think that
it is in his power to so command. He says to them :
Creon : See, then, that ye be guardians of the mandate.
Chorus : La\' the burden of this task upon some younger man.
Creon : Xay. watchers of the corpse have been found.
Chorus : What then, is this further charge that thou wouldst give?
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Creon : That ye side not with the breakers of these commands.^'
But why, we may ask, does he suspect that they will be broken ?
Why does he command them not to side with those who are going
to transgress his first law ? The answer is evident. In Greece burial
was a family obligation, a rite performed by the nearest of kin.
The only living immediate relatives of the unburied Theban are
Antigone and Ismene ; if anyone were to commit the forbidden act
it would be they. By making death the penalty for transgression it
seems that he hoped to wipe out the last survivors of the ro\al
family. That may be the reason why he was so ready to accuse
Ismene despite Antigone's denial of her sister's complicity. He
releases Ismene only when it is apparent to everybody that she is
innocent ; and he changes the sentence of death which he has passed
upon Antigone to one of imprisonment, not through compassion for
the girl, but because he learned of the awful results that would follow
her death.
The attitude of each contestant is also significant. Antigone
asserts that the elders sympathize with her even though they dare
not as yet express their views. She never admits that she has done
wrong; Creon does. This difference becomes more apparent when
we pause to consider and compare the fate of each.
Antigone does not think that it is a sin to give burial to a brother.
Before she executes her resolve she says to her sister, "I shall rest,
a loved one with him I loved, sinless in my crime ; for I owe a
stronger allegiance to the dead than to the living: in that world I
shall abide forever." Proudly she tells Creon that human laws
cannot supercede those of the gods. "Yes, for it was not Zeus who
had published me the edict ; not such are the laws set among men
by the Justice who dwells with those below
; nor deemed I that thy
decrees were of such a force, that a mortal could override the un-
written and unfailing statutes of heaven." She is not sorry for what
she does, and never repents: "So for me to meet this doom is tri-
fling; but if I had suffered my mother's son to lie in death an
unburied corpse, that would have grieved me; for this. 1 am not
grieved. And if my present deeds are foolish in thy sight, it may
be a foolish judge that arraigns my folly." Strangling herself with
her veil she dies as she had lived, convinced of the justice of her act.
•"'Based on Jebb's translation.
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When Creon learns of the punishment that is in store for him
he yields, although it is too late. He admits his error and seeks
to rectify it with his own hands. He first humbles himself to give
burial rites to Polynices and then approaches the tomb to release
Antigone. Here he meets with Haemon who, refusing to listen to
his father's entreaties, spits upon his face with scorn, and stabs
himself when his attempt to kill his father has failed. Creon realizes
the folly of his mandate. He laments: "Woe for the sins of a dark-
ened soul, stubborn sins, fraught with death. Ah, ye behold us, the
sire who has slain and the son who has perished. Woe is me, for
the wretched blindness of mv counsels. Alas my son, thou diedest in
thy youth by a timeless doom, woe is me—thy spirit has fled, not
by thy folly but by mine own." Eurydice, his wife, hearing of the
unhappy fate of their son, takes her own life, cursing Creon with
her dving breath. Creon is completely overwhelmed : "Lead me
away, a rash, foolish man ; who hath slain thee, my own, unwittingly,
and thee my wife—unhappy that I am. I know not which way I
should lead my gaze, or where I should seek support ; for all is
amiss with that which is in my hand—and yonder a crushing fate
hath leapt upon my head."'
Creon is condemned by everybod}-. Haemon has told him that
the Thebans, with one voice, deny that she has sinned. !More elo-
(juent are the words of Tiresias, the blind and infallible seer, who
informs him that the gods are angered by his double crime: "the
detention of the dead among the living, and the imprisonment of
the living in the abode of the dead." The punishment that follows
adds weight to this contention. Finally, the Chorus says that Creon
has seen his mistake only when it is too late, adding that wisdom
is the supreme part of happiness and that reverence towards the
gods must be inviolate.
All these facts show that the guilt and punishment of Antigone
and Creon were radically different, that the sympathy of the chorus
and the audience is not equally divided. Our pity is for Antigone
and not for Creon : we feel that he richly deserves his fate, while
Antigone commands love and admiration. The conflict between
the human and the divine laws results in the condemnation of the
human laws.
Blind obedience to this ethical theor}-, patently false in many
cases, kept Hegel from applying his distinction between classic and
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romantic art to tragedy. He failed, consequently, to notice a dis-
tinction that made its first appearance in Antigone, and which has
grown ever since, namely, that there are two kinds of tragedy, that
of victory and that of defeat.
Creon leaves the stage a culprit sunk in despair, a victim of
circumstances : Antigone dies a heroine, confident that she has acted
wisely and consistently with her own character. We, too, as spec-
tators, feel that the strength of Antigone's life is marked by a sense
of victory, and that Creon's life is one of complete frustration.
This difTerence may be said to have reached its fullest expression
in O'XeiU's The Great God Brozcn. Brown, the character of futility,
is outwardly a successful architect, but inwardly uncreative and
utterly defeated. Dion, on the other hand, is outwardly defeated,
yet inwardly successful ; his inner life is full of vigor and marked by
triumph. Brown feels the sterility of his life very keenly, donning
Dion's mask after his partner's death. He is cheated and vanquished
while Dion dies having had his fill of life.
We have seen that the concept of ethical division, paramount in
Hegel's theory, prevented him from giving a true delineation of
tragedy : his attempt to balance the opposite forces of a tragic con-
flict so limited his analysis that it excluded most of the recognized
tragedies. It was his object to interpret all known phenomena in
the light of his basal principles. His philosophy is undoubtedly the
work of genius ; but one wonders whether he was not too literal in
his adherence to his plan, and a slave to his concepts by depriving
tragedy of anv individuality or character of its own, and by making
it just another of the many manifestations of the Spirit.
